By: Taghreed Saadeh
As the war on Gaza enters its 22nd month, Hamas is no longer the movement it once claimed to be. Its true defeat lies not only in the devastation and blockade but in the collapse of its internal political project, the erosion of its Arab standing, and the fading of its role within the so-called “Axis of Resistance”—a role it joined late, following long-standing disputes with its main allies in Damascus and Hezbollah, and its earlier alignment with the Muslim Brotherhood’s agenda in Syria.
Since October 7, 2023, Gaza’s civilian population has borne the brunt of the ongoing war: thousands of martyrs, millions displaced, near-total destruction, and the collapse of basic living conditions. After nearly two years of suffering, many Palestinians no longer view this war as a national cause but rather as a burden they can no longer afford—with no political horizon in sight.
In the absence of internal accountability or any meaningful review of the movement’s conduct, a clear shift in public sentiment has begun to surface—even among those once close to Hamas. Former leaders have openly voiced their frustration, affirming that the continuation of the war now serves only the occupation, which—according to Israeli media—seeks to keep Hamas present on the ground as a pretext for ongoing aggression. Ironically, Israel claims to have eliminated most of Hamas’s military and political leadership, leaving only its exiled leadership abroad.
In 2017, Hamas attempted to rebrand itself through the release of the “Document of General Principles and Policies,” which declared it a “Palestinian Islamic national liberation movement” and distanced it from formal ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. The document also expressed conditional acceptance of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders, without recognizing Israel, and adopted more moderate language compared to its 1988 founding charter.
However, this rhetorical shift failed to alter Hamas’s standing regionally or internationally. The movement remained categorized within the political Islam camp, and major Arab states continued to view it as an extension of the Brotherhood. Its isolation peaked in November 2024 when Qatar asked Hamas leaders to leave its territory—a move widely seen as the end of Arab political support. If not for Doha’s role in ceasefire mediation, the expulsion would have been total. Osama Hamdan’s relocation to Mauritania, which has become a haven for several Hamas leaders evacuated from Gaza as part of prisoner exchange deals under the “wounded and family” classification, underscores this retreat.
The 2017 document was a tactical move to break the isolation, but it did not lead to a real repositioning or international recognition of Hamas as an independent political actor.
Today, Hamas faces severe internal estrangement and mounting Arab isolation, as part of a broader regional effort to dismantle political Islam—particularly the Muslim Brotherhood. This trend is evident in Jordan, Tunisia, Egypt, and in the policies of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which have openly rejected the Brotherhood’s influence.
Internationally, Hamas remains on the terrorist organization lists of the United States, Canada, and the European Union—blocking any meaningful engagement or recognition. These designations have been reaffirmed repeatedly by Western governments.
Given this reality, Hamas cannot continue in its current form. Without a comprehensive internal reckoning and a reintegration into a unified Palestinian national project, its political demise is inevitable. The movement has lost its popular legitimacy, its political program has failed, and its discourse no longer resonates.
Eighteen years of Palestinian division and unilateral rule over Gaza have proven the failure of Hamas’s model, which has brought nothing to the Palestinian people but destruction, death, and a loss of direction.
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