By Taghreed Saadeh
Based on observing what has taken place and continues to unfold in the Arab region over at least the past decade, it is difficult to interpret events outside the framework of “conflict management,” which appears to be one of the key tools of U.S. policy in the region. The issue is not limited to confronting adversaries or supporting allies; it extends to managing regional balances by sustaining a state of ongoing attrition and preventing the emergence of strong Arab states capable of independently making sovereign political decisions.
From this perspective, Islamist movements and religious political parties have become part of a broader regional and international system, in which they are utilized when necessary and assigned specific roles within political arrangements that serve the interests of major powers more than the projects these movements themselves claim to represent particularly those related to resistance against occupation.
Hamas stands out as one of the key examples through which this phenomenon can be understood. I had previously revealed the existence of negotiations and contacts between Hamas and the U.S. administration in 2014, which I saw as an important indication that Washington did not view the movement merely as an adversarial organization to be isolated, but rather as an actor that could be engaged with and incorporated into broader political and regional calculations.
During the so called Arab Spring, Hamas clearly aligned itself with the broader political project of Islamist movements in the region, and supported the rise of late Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi following the fall of Hosni Mubarak’s regime. At that time, the discourse of resistance within the movement receded in favor of a wider political project aimed at reshaping the region, with the rise of political Islam to power in several Arab countries seen as a real possibility.
However, this project did not succeed. Several influential Arab states moved to counter the expansion of political Islam, leading to the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood’s rule in Egypt and the decline of the broader project many regional actors had invested in. With the collapse of this trajectory, Hamas gradually returned to the rhetoric of resistance and repositioned itself within what is known as the “Axis of Resistance.”
During the Syrian crisis, the matter went beyond a mere political disagreement with Damascus and Tehran; it reached the level of confrontation on the ground. Hamas found itself effectively aligned with forces and groups that fought against the Syrian state and its allies, using the same weapons and similar tactics in that conflict, which placed it in direct confrontation with Syria and Iran at that stage. However, subsequent regional shifts and changing power dynamics led the movement to reassess its position and gradually return to the very axis it had previously distanced itself from, as alliances were reshaped according to evolving circumstances.
This issue goes beyond Hamas alone. The deeper question concerns how the United States engages with religious parties and Islamist movements in the Arab world. Was Washington truly seeking to eliminate these movements, or did it view them as tools that could be used within a broader strategy of conflict management and of preventing the emergence of strong, centralized national powers capable of asserting full political independence?
A review of several regional cases reveals a striking pattern. While channels of communication were kept open with some of these movements, official governments and recognized state institutions were often subjected to sustained political, economic, and financial pressure. In the Palestinian case, for example, Hamas was treated as an unavoidable reality, while the Palestinian Authority faced financial and political constraints that weakened its ability to build strong institutions capable of advancing a unified national project.
This dynamic contributed to the consolidation of the Palestinian division between Gaza and the West Bank an internal split that not only weakened the Palestinian Authority but also undermined the broader national project itself. At the same time, political initiatives such as the “Deal of the Century” reflected efforts to impose political frameworks on the official Palestinian leadership within a fragmented and institutionally weakened environment.
In Lebanon, another example emerges. Hezbollah, despite its military and political strength, has become a force that operates beyond the Lebanese state’s institutions and remains closely linked to Iran’s regional project. Rather than leading to a stronger state or advancing the broader goals often associated with resistance narratives, this reality has contributed to a more fragile Lebanese state, unable to fully monopolize security and political decision making.
A deeper reading of what has happened over the past decade suggests that the issue is not simply a confrontation between these movements and international powers, but rather the way in which these actors have been integrated into a regional and international system based on crisis management rather than resolution, on exhausting states rather than strengthening them, and on maintaining a fragile balance that prevents the emergence of unified and independent Arab powers.
Understanding this framework allows public opinion in the Arab world to better assess where national interest truly lies, beyond emotional attachment to slogans of liberation or resistance alone. The issue goes beyond such slogans and requires a more comprehensive reading of political realities.
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